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Abstract
Abstract Small businesses (SMEs) depend on banks for credit. We show that the severity of the
Eurozone crisis was worse in countries that borrowed more from domestic banks (``domestic bank
dependence'') compared with countries that borrowed more from international banks. Eurozone
banking integration in the years 2000-2008 involved cross-border lending between banks while
foreign banks' lending to the real sector stayed flat. Hence, SMEs remained dependent on
domestic banks and were vulnerable to global banking sector shocks. We confirm, using a
calibrated quantitative model, that domestic bank dependence makes sectors and countries with
many SMEs vulnerable to global banking shocks.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines how the global retrenchment in cross-border interbank flows during the global
financial crisis affected the Eurozone countries. Since the inception of the Euro until 2008, cross-
border bank lending in the Eurozone increased considerably, but mainly in the form of cross-border
lending to banks, while cross-border bank-lending to the non-bank sector increased much less.
Thus, the real economy in most member countries remained dependent on the provision of credit
by domestic banks. This pattern—which we refer to as “domestic bank dependence”—implied that
the growth in domestic credit to the real sector in the years before the crisis was financed mainly
by domestic banks, which in turn funded themselves through cross-border interbank borrowing.
During the Eurozone crisis cross-border interbank lending declined sharply, while cross-border
bank lending to the real sector remained relatively stable. This left economies and sectors that
were reliant on domestic banks for finance particularly exposed to the global retrenchment in
cross-border interbank lending.1
We expect that sectors and countries with many small and medium-sized firms (SMEs) would
be particularly dependent on domestic banks for the provision of credit because SMEs are gener-
ally too small and too opaque to borrow from banks in other countries or from the bond market.
Domestic banks generally have better information about local small firms and often engage in
long-term relationships with their borrowers. This allows SMEs to satisfy their demand for fi-
nance that is not easily available from big foreign banks that mainly lend at arms-length. On the
other hand, domestic bank dependence makes small firms particularly vulnerable to shocks that
affect the domestic banking sector. Due to their relative opaqueness, SMEs can only imperfectly
substitute other sources of credit for their domestic (often local) bank loans. Consistent with this
firm-borrowing channel, our key empirical result is that the decline in cross-border interbank lend-
ing had larger negative real effects on output in countries with high domestic bank dependence, in
particular in sectors with many SMEs.
To explain our findings, we build a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model. The model allows for both global and domestic (“local”) banks and includes two sectors:
a sector populated by “small” firms, which are reliant on borrowing from local banks, and a sector
populated by “large” firms, which can satisfy a larger portion of their borrowing needs from global
banks. Global banks, in contrast to local banks, do not satisfy the funding needs of firms (espe-
cially, small firms) completely and, as a result, firms have to borrow some of their funds from local
banks, which leads to domestic bank dependence in our model. Local banks collect deposits from
their home country, but can also fund themselves by borrowing from global banks in the European
cross-border interbank market.
We use simulated data from the model to replicate our empirical finding that the drop in
cross-border lending between banks had the biggest real effects in countries with high levels
of bank dependence and sectors with many SMEs. In the baseline specification of our model,
cross-border lending to banks contracts more than cross-border lending to the real sector because
profit-maximizing banks will seek to implement the maximum possible leverage while having to
1We do not evaluate the benefits from integrated cross-border lending to banks relative to the more fragmented
markets that existed before the introduction of the euro. See the survey of Sørensen and Villegas-Sanchez (2015) for
the benefits of financial integration in the absence of market imperfections.
1
shrink their balance sheets due to a global deleveraging shock. This will induce them to shift
lending to high-return activities that have high regulatory risk weights, such as lending to firms.
While this benefits big firms (in relative terms), the contraction in cross-border interbank lending
reduces local banks’ lending capacity. This disproportionately hurts SMEs because these can only
partially substitute for the shortfall in local bank lending. The model simulations confirm that this
mechanism is able to generate the patterns that we observe in the data.
Our empirical analysis alone cannot conclusively answer if our findings are driven by a truly
global banking sector shock or by shocks to domestic banking sectors that just unfolded in a
synchronized manner during the Eurozone crisis. We therefore turn to our model for identification.
We run versions of our model with global and synchronized local banking shocks. Results from
these simulations suggests that local banking shocks cannot quantitatively explain the patterns we
find in the data. However, our model also suggests that the distinction between these two types of
banking shocks is ultimately irrelevant for our key finding; interbank integration leaves countries
more exposed to banking sector shocks than direct banking integration.
The model also helps identify credit demand shocks from banking (i.e. credit supply) shocks.
Our simulations show that synchronized shocks to credit demand; e.g., due to concurrent declines
in total factor productivity in the crisis countries, cannot account for the patterns in the data.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a first look at the
data and some initial stylized facts. Section 3 places our analysis in the context of the literature.
Section 4 uses a stylized theoretical framework to motivate our empirical specifications that allow
us to study the transmission of the financial crisis across countries on real data. Our simple DSGE
model is laid out and brought to the data in Section 5, while Section 6 summarizes the quantitative
results obtained from model simulations. Section 7 offers conclusions.
2 A look at the data
It is commonly observed that the European Monetary Union has given a boost to banking inte-
gration in Europe. Figure 1, which is based on locational banking statistics from the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS), displays lending by foreign banks for a range of EMU countries,
separately and combined (EMU-11). Flows of bank loans surged in the first decade of the EMU,
but most of this growth was due to increased foreign bank lending to domestic banks—foreign
bank lending to the domestic non-bank sector (which here includes the domestic private sector
and government) increased less and has remained relatively flat. We argue that foreign lending to
domestic banks versus lending to the non-bank sector are not simple substitutes, and, indeed, for-
eign lending to the non-bank sector generally proved resilient during the financial and sovereign
debt crisis while bank-to-bank lending virtually imploded. The synchronization of the collapse
in cross-border bank-to-bank lending is noteworthy in this context. Even though countries’ post-
2008 experiences varied considerably in terms of the severity of banking and sovereign crisis and
in their real effects, the initial trigger (the U.S. subprime crisis spilling over to Europe and lead-
ing to a worldwide crisis in interbanking markets) can be seen as a common factor which had
differential impacts across countries, depending on their pre-existing vulnerabilities.
Figure 1 sets the scene for our empirical analysis. Banking sector integration in Europe was
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lopsided in the sense that there was too little real banking integration: the real sector was unable to
diversify its sources of finance away from domestic banks. Domestic real-sector lending contin-
ued to be financed by domestic banks, which fund themselves by borrowing from foreign banks.
This led to the pattern we observe in the data, with the growth in cross-border lending driven by
bank-to-bank lending.2 We illustrate these two different concepts of banking integration in Fig-
ure 2. There are two countries, one referred to as the core country, and the other as the periphery
country. The thick red arrow indicates the large cross-border banking flows in the data, whereas
the thin grey arrows indicate the small flows of foreign bank lending from each country’s banks
to the other country’s real sector. As was the case in the EMU before the crisis, net bank-to-bank
flows were largely in the direction of the periphery country. The graph illustrates that, in the ab-
sence of direct cross-border real sector lending (thin or absent grey arrows), and in spite of high
levels of bank-to-bank integration (thick red arrows between the two countries’ banking sectors),
the periphery remains vulnerable to both international liquidity shocks and domestic real shocks.3
This happens for two reasons: first, domestic banks have domestically concentrated asset port-
folios, which make them vulnerable to any real-sector shocks in the home economy. Second, an
international world-wide funding shock to banks in the periphery country may cut off bank credit
supply to the domestic real sector.4
Figure 2 suggests that the impact of a domestic banking sector shock on the domestic economy
will depend on the extent to which real sector credit is provided by domestic banks. As a measure
of domestic bank dependence in country c—abbreviated as DBDc—we propose the share of total
real sector credit that is provided by domestic banks:
DBDc =
Domestic bank lending to the real private sector in country c
Total credit to the real private sector in country c
.
We construct DBDc using data from the Private Sector Credit Database (PSCD) compiled by
the BIS. This database contains detailed information by country on the borrowing sector and the
source of credit (domestic banks and foreign banks as well as debt securities). In the PSCD, the
private sector comprises private non-financial corporations, households, and non-profit institutions
serving households. The database rests on multiple data sources (national accounts, monetary
surveys, and the BIS banking statistics) and has some gaps in its country coverage, which generally
limits our European sample in the remainder of the paper to 11 Eurozone countries (Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain).
The data is quarterly and starts in the first quarter of 1997. We therefore limit all of our data
to the time period 1997Q1–2013Q4 in order to focus on the period of the Eurozone crisis and
the preceding years. We obtain a time-invariant (pre-crisis) measure for DBDc by taking pre-2008
averages for each country.
Because we construct DBDc as a pre-crisis average, it is an ex ante measure of how exposed
2Specifically, banks in the EMU periphery countries mainly borrowed from banks located in core economies which
in turn borrowed in the U.S. money market (Hale and Obstfeld (2016)).
3As pointed out by Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2004), financial integration provides insurance against local liquidity
shocks, because international lending quickly can replace local lending as long as the return to local investment remains
high.
4For example, this could be the case in a global banking crisis when cross-border bank lending—which is arguably
much more short-term than cross-border bank-to-real sector lending—dries up.
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aggregate credit supply in a country was to domestic banking sector shocks at the beginning of the
Great Recession. The real effects in terms of output, consumption, or employment of any given
drop in credit supply will depend on how elastic the private sector is in its choice of financing
source. Figure 3 provides data from the 2011 edition of the European Central Bank’s and EU
Commission’s Survey of Access to Finance by Enterprises (SAFE) on sources of external finance
of SMEs (defined as firms with fewer than 250 employees). The figure illustrates that bank loans
are by far the most important source of external finance for SMEs in most countries.
We would therefore expect that SMEs during the crises were strongly affected in countries
with high domestic bank dependence. Figure 4 provides prima facie evidence that this is the
case. The first panel plots the share of SMEs that reported problems with obtaining external
finance against country-level banking dependence (DBDc). The second panel plots the share of
firms reporting increased interest expenses minus the share of firms reporting decreased expenses
against DBDc. The two plots deliver the same message: in countries with high levels of domestic
bank dependence, the impact of the crisis on the financial situation of SMEs was worse.
In the remainder of the paper, we examine in more detail the patterns outlined in this section.
In particular, we estimate how cross-country variation in domestic bank dependence interacted
with cross-country and cross-sectoral variation in SME shares in the international transmission of
the common shock presented by the financial crisis.
3 Related literature
Our analysis draws on several strands of the literature. The first strand concerns the role of banking
integration in the transmission of macroeconomic shocks. Here, we also connect to an emerging
literature on the global financial cycle that examines how changes in global financial conditions
lead to heterogeneous but highly synchronized real outcomes across countries. The second strand
encompasses recent empirical work that has emphasized the particular financing constraints faced
by small firms during the European financial and sovereign debt crisis.
Regarding the empirical literature on the international transmission of banking sector shocks,
we build on Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000), who showed how the burst of Japan’s property
bubble in the 1990s was reflected in Japanese banks contracting lending in the United States. Imai
and Takarabe (2011) use a similar approach to study how the same shock spread across Japan’s
prefectures. Our paper is also related to recent work by Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012a,b) in its
emphasis on the role of global banks’ internal capital markets in international transmission and
to Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Peydro (2013) and Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Perri
(2013), who show that the impact of banking integration on business cycle synchronization differs
between crisis and tranquil periods.
Recent papers that have recognized the role of the particular financing constraints faced by
SMEs during the Eurozone crisis include Ferrando and Mulier (2015) and Ferrando, Popov and
Udell (2018). Ferrando and Mulier (2015) match SMEs’ survey responses to balance sheet in-
formation to check whether reported financial constraints line up with balance sheet facts. Our
analysis is also close to Ferrando, Popov and Udell (2018), who use firm-level data to document
that SME-financing constraints are exacerbated in countries which were under macroeconomic
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and sovereign risk “stress” during the financial crisis.
Different from the studies discussed so far, our analysis of international transmission focuses
on the interaction of SME prevalence and the nature of banking integration in the Eurozone, with
its focus on bank-to-bank integration as a key factor in the transmission of the crisis across coun-
tries, regions, and sectors. The empirical framework for our analysis heavily draws on earlier work
by one of us: Hoffmann and Okubo (2017) find that mechanisms, similar to the ones we document
for Europe, were at work during Japan’s lost decade. Our emphasis on the differential impact of
international and domestic bank lending on sector-level growth during the Eurozone crisis closely
connects our work to that of Schnabel and Seckinger (2015). While Schnabel and Seckinger
(2015) focus on external finance dependence in the sense of Rajan and Zingales (1998), we draw
attention to firm size and the particular dependence of small firms on the local provision of credit
as a key friction. Our paper also relates closely to recent work at the International Monetary Fund
(2015), which emphasizes the different impacts that cross-border and direct local lending by for-
eign banks have on financial stability. We add to this by focusing on how international lending has
affected real outcomes during the crisis in the Eurozone and by highlighting that it is important
to distinguish between international bank-to-bank and bank-to-real sector lending. In this context,
we also connect to the recent paper by Martinez (2015), who documents the role of cross-border
bank-to-bank lending in fueling boom and bust cycles.
We complement our empirical analysis with a stylized DSGE model in which we explain our
key findings. This model builds on Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Perri (2013) and extends it
along several dimensions. First, we introduce an interbanking market to allow for a distinction
between cross-border lending to banks and the real sector. Secondly, we introduce a non-tradeable
sector populated by SMEs that borrow from global banks and local domestic banks. The latter, in
turn, fund themselves from global banks in the interbank market. We use this model to replicate
the stylized facts that we document in our empirical analysis.
Our model also relates to Kollmann, Enders and Müller (2011) and Kerl and Niepmann (2015).
Kollmann, Enders and Müller (2011) examine the role of global banks in global business cycle
transmission. Our framework differs from theirs by allowing for different modalities of inter-
national bank lending—direct lending to firms by global banks vs. interbank lending—and two
sectors in each country that differ in their financing needs. Kerl and Niepmann (2015) explain the
choice between direct and interbank cross-border lending as a function of barriers to entry into
foreign banking markets. However, their framework is static and parsimonious in the sense that
it does not articulate the exact form of these frictions. In our model, these entry barriers take the
form of frictions which give local banks an advantage in lending to SMEs. Because we embed
direct and interbank cross-border bank lending into a fully dynamic model, we can study how the
modality of cross-border bank lending affects the dynamics and transmission of macroeconomic
shocks. By illustrating how the international financing structure of an economy affects the trans-
mission of global financial shocks, we also make contact with the emerging literature on the global
financial cycle (Rey (2015); Bruno and Shin (2015a)).
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4 Domestic bank dependence and the transmission of the financial
crisis across the Eurozone
Econometric specifications
The starting point for our empirical analysis is the literature on the firm-borrowing channel. Fol-
lowing Khwaja and Mian (2008), we posit the following reduced-form link between fluctuations
in domestic real sector credit and output growth:
∆ log GVAc,st = γc,s×∆ log CREDITct +ηc,st , (1)
where ∆ log GVAc,st is the growth rate of gross valued added in country c, in sector s, ∆ log CREDITct is
the growth of domestic credit to the real sector in country c, and ηc,st is a productivity shock. The
central insight from the literature on the firm-borrowing channel is that firms are heterogeneous in
their ability to substitute fluctuations in the availability of bank credit for other forms of funding.
We can think of the coefficient γc,s as capturing this ability, which is likely to vary by sector and/or
country. For instance, if γc,s = 0, firms can fully offset variations in bank loan supply by turning
to internal or non-bank finance (e.g., by issuing bonds). If γc,s > 0, fluctuations in bank finance
cannot be fully offset and will have real effects. Based on our earlier discussion, we conjecture
that country-sectors with higher SME shares will experience a stronger firm-borrowing channel,
so that
γc,s = γ0+ γ1× SMEc,s, (2)
where SMEc,s stands for the share of SMEs with less than 250 employees in value added in country
c, sector s in 2008, and where we expect that γ1 > 0.
We next link domestic credit supply to shocks to cross-border bank lending. We interpret the
financial crisis as a global shock to banks’ lending capacity that, in principle, was common to
all Eurozone countries, but that affected countries differently according to their dependence on
domestic banks for finance. Based on this presumption, we conjecture the relation:
∆ log CREDIT
c
t = DBD
c×∆GBSt +ξ ct , (3)
where DBDc is our measure of domestic bank dependence, ∆GBSt is an indicator of the shock to the
global banking sector, and ξ c,st is a country-sector specific credit demand shock.
Our hypothesis is that the global banking sector shock mainly manifested itself in a breakdown
of cross-border lending between banks, whereas, as we have seen in Figure 1, direct cross-border
bank lending to the real sector was much less affected. We therefore construct a measure ∆GBSt ,that
captures bank-to-bank lending net of bank-to-nonbank lending, as
∆GBSt =− [∆ log B2Bt −∆ log B2Nt ] ,
where B2Bt and B2Nt denote the total (in sample) cross-country volume of indirect (bank-to-bank)
and direct (bank-to-nonbank) cross-border lending, respectively.
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Putting equations (1), (2) and (3) together, we obtain
∆ log GVAc,st = ∆GBSt × [α1DBDc× SMEc,s+α2SMEc,s+α3DBDc]+CONTROLS+ τt +µc,s+ εc,st , (4)
which is our main empirical specification. The coefficient of interest is α1 and we expect α1 < 0:
the global banking sector shock should have particularly adverse effects in countries and sectors
that are particularly dependent on domestic banks for credit provision, because they have a high
share of SMEs.
To see how our approach achieves identification of α1, we note first that ∆GBSt is an aggregate
(“world”-wide) variable and is therefore uncorrelated with purely local (country- and/or sector-
specific) credit demand shocks. As is easy to verify, the residual term can be written as εc,st =
γc,s×ξ c,st +ηc,st . This term absorbs country-sector specific components of credit demand that are
orthogonal to ∆GBSt , while the effects of ∆GBSt that are common to all country-sectors (as well as
any other common factor with homogeneous effects across country-sectors) will be absorbed by
the time effect, τt .5
One remaining challenge to identification is that we are neglecting unobserved common factors
that may be correlated with ∆GBSt and that also differ in their impact across countries and sectors
in a way that is correlated with the country-sector variation in DBDc × SMEc,s. To see this, let
ft be a potential un-modelled factor which loads on output in country-sector c,s with loading
δ c,s. Then, whenever cov( ft , ∆GBSt) 6= 0, we need to assume that the cross-sectional covariance
cov(δ c,s, DBDc× SMEc,s) equals zero.6
The assumption cov(δ c,s, DBDc× SMEc,s) = 0 might be violated if, during the global financial
crisis, there was also an aggregate (EU-wide or global) decline in the demand for loans. This
decline plausibly could have been strongest in countries with high local bank dependence and in
sectors that have many SMEs that mainly serve local markets. Our measure of the global banking-
sector shock addresses this concern by focusing on the difference in growth rates between cross-
border bank-to-bank and bank-to-nonbank lending. To the extent that a global credit-demand
shock affects the two forms of lending symmetrically, their difference is left to capture shocks
that are specific to the global banking sector and thus mainly to the credit supply-side. Our theo-
retical model below will allow us to quantitatively explore whether this identifying assumption is
justified.
Data
To implement the above regressions, we measure output growth using quarterly data on gross
value added at the sectoral level from Eurostat.7 For all output measures, we obtain real per capita
5Because SMEc,s and DBDc are time-invariant in our estimation, their respective first-order effects will be absorbed
by the country-sector fixed effects, µc,s. In addition, several versions of the main regression that we present below will
also control for country-time and sector-time effects.
6See Hoffmann and Okubo (2017) for a detailed discussion.
7Sectoral gross value added is obtained from Eurostat’s Gross value added and income A*10 industry breakdowns
(namq_10_a10). We drop agriculture, finance and insurance, and public administration and limit our sample to six
sectors (1-digit NACE rev 2 codes in parentheses) for which we also have data on the corresponding SME shares:
industry except construction (BCDE), construction (F), wholesale and retail + transport and storage + accomodation
and food services (GHI), information and communication (J), real estate (L), and professional activities + administrative
and support services (MN).
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values by deflating with the respective sectoral deflators and using population data from the same
source. Because quarterly data can be noisy, we study annual growth rates of all variables (notably
real per capita GVA) by taking differences between quarter t and t − 4, so that ∆ log GVAc,st =
log GVAc,st − log GVAc,st−4 throughout the paper.
While DBDc is constructed in the way already described in Section 2, our data on SME impor-
tance is from the 2018 issue of the annual database accompanying the European Commissions’
SME performance review.8 Specifically, we construct our measure SMEc,s as the share in value
added at factor costs (million euros at current prices) at the country-sector level of firms with
fewer than 250 employees. While the values for DBDc are constructed as pre-2008, within-country
averages, data on the value added of small businesses is not generally available before 2008. We
therefore use the 2008 values to construct SMEc,s.
Main empirical results
The results of the baseline country-sector level specifications (4) are summarized in Table 1. Con-
sistent with our theoretical interpretation, the main coefficient of interest, α1, is negative and sig-
nificant throughout. The first column of the table shows the results for all countries. The following
columns examine the sensitivity of our results to the exact sample of countries. Specifically, we
augment the baseline specification to include a dummy for the EMU core economies (Belgium,
France, Germany, and the Netherlands) or a dummy for Greece in the interactions with the crisis
indicator.
In all specifications, the coefficient α1 stays negative, significant and quite stable relative to the
baseline estimate in the first column. The results suggest that dependence on domestic banks for
finance was detrimental mainly for country-sectors with many SMEs. The standalone terms for
SMEc,s and DBDc are insignificant across almost all specifications. This suggests that for the average
country-sector an increase (decrease) in the SME share or a lower dependence on domestic banks
does not unambiguously lead to higher or lower growth. Rather, it seems that the real effects of the
global banking shock are robustly modulated through the interaction between these two variables.
In Table 2, we subject our country-sector level regressions to further robustness checks. In the
first two columns, we add, in turn, sector-time and country-time effects, in addition to the country-
sector and time effects that were already included in the previous specifications. Our estimate
of α1 stays negative in both specifications and remains significant. This is also true for a fully
saturated specification in which we include both country-time and sector-time effects. We also
run a version of our regression, in which we split the sample of country-sectors into high (above-
median) and low (below-median) shares of SMEs. Again, our results hold up. This regression,
reported in column (4), will be our main reference point when comparing the DSGE model that
we present in the next section to the regressions results based on actual data. In the DSGE model,
within each country, there are two sectors: one populated only by SMEs and one populated only by
large firms. This setup directly maps into the specification reported in column (4) of Table 2, where
sectors are coded as being SME-intensive (or not) using a dummy. The economic magnitude of the
results is large. A one standard deviation shock to ∆GBSt (0.09) in a country with a domestic bank
dependence one standard deviation (0.13) above the sample average results in a 0.5 percentage
8https://ec.europa.eu/growth/smes/business-friendly-environment/performance-review_en
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points larger drop in gross value added in high SME sectors compared with low SME sectors
(0.005≈ 0.43×0.09×0.13).
The last two columns of Table 2 show that our findings hold up even in the cross-section:
column (5) presents a cross-sectional regression of the post-2008 drop in sectoral GVA growth
on 2008 SME shares and the interaction of SME with local bank dependence, while column (6)
repeats the before-after regression, but now coding the SME share as high or low, as in the panel
regression in column (4). The result with high-low SME dummy remains significant and eco-
nomically large: the decline in average growth rate in gross value added in the crisis period for
a country with a domestic bank dependence one standard deviation (0.13) above the sample av-
erage is 1.3 percentage points stronger in high SME sectors compared with low SME sectors
(0.013≈ 0.009×0.13).9
Figure 5 visualizes the results from the before-after regression in column (6). For each country,
it plots the difference between post-2008 and pre-2008 sectoral growth rates against the pre-2008
levels of domestic bank dependence. Sectors with above-median shares of SMEs appear as red
dots and those with below-median shares of SMEs appear as blue diamonds. Across the whole
sample, the link between growth and SME shares seems weak; however, once we distinguish
between high and low levels of SME shares, we find that there is a clear negative link between
growth and domestic bank dependence in country-sectors with high SME shares. This negative
link is much weaker for low-SME sectors.
We also study the dynamic response of real activity to the global banking sector shock. To this
end, we split the sample in two groups: country-sectors with above-median shares of SMEs and
country-sectors with low SME shares. For each group, we then estimate local linear projections
of the form:
log GVAc,st+h− log GVAc,st−1 = αh×DBDc×∆GBSt + τt +µc,s+ εc,st+h, (5)
at horizons of h = 0,1, ...,4 years. Local linear projections (LLP) were first proposed by Jordà
(2005) and capture the dynamics of the dependent variable in a very general way. While concep-
tually similar to impulse responses, LLP do not require the underlying data generating process to
be linear.
Figure 6 plots the coefficients αh up to horizon of 4 years for our country-sector data set (re-
flecting the effects on cumulative GVA growth) separately for high (red lines) and low (blue lines)
SME country-sectors. Shaded areas indicate corresponding 90% confidence bands, constructed
with standard errors clustered by country and time. For the high-SME sectors, the effect of high
domestic bank dependence is highly persistent and statistically significant, accumulating to an
output loss of around 1.5 percent over five years to a one standard deviation shock to ∆GBSt (0.09)
for a country with a domestic bank dependence one standard deviation (0.13) above the sample
average (0.015≈ 1.25×0.09×0.13). For the low-SME sectors, there is virtually no effect.
9As pointed out by Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004), panel diff-in-diff regressions such as our baseline
specifications can be spuriously significant if there is essentially only one common treatment (in our case: the crisis).
They therefore recommend a “before-after” cross-sectional regression such as the one presented here as a robustness
check.
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5 A theoretical model
We propose a tractable DSGE model with local and global banks and two production sectors,
which we use to interpret the empirical results. Specifically, the model formalizes the idea that
bank-to-bank lending exposes local bank sectors to global banking sector shocks without reducing
the exposure of the economy to idiosyncratic shocks.
Agents and markets
There are two open economies in our model, each populated by a representative household, a big
firm producing tradeable goods, a small firm producing non-tradeable goods, and a local bank.10
The (small) home country represents one of the 11 EMU countries in our sample, while the (large)
foreign one represents the “rest of the EMU.” Additionally, there is a global bank, which operates
in the two countries (EMU) and has access to wholesale funding in the rest of the world (e.g., the
U.S. money market).
Firms Firms in sector s= {BF, SME} (BF refers to big firms and SME to SMEs) have the production
function:
Y st = θ
s
t (K
s
t−1)
αs(Nst )
1−αs ,
where, for sector s, Y st ,θ st , Kst−1, N
s
t and αs denote output, total factor productivity, capital (at the
end of the previous period), labor, and capital intensity, respectively. Firms in both sectors are
owned by households, operate in a perfectly competitive environment, and maximize the present
discounted value of their profits (dividends):
max
{Nst , Kst , Lst }∞t=0
E0
[ ∞
∑
t=0
Λ0:tDIVst
]
,
where Λt:t+l is the household stochastic discount factor at horizon l. Dividends are defined as:
DIVst = P
s
t Y
s
t −WtNst −Pt
(
Ist +ϕ
I,s
t
)
+Lst −Lst−1(1+ rl,st−1),
where Pst denotes price of output in sector s, Pt is the price of the final good, Wt is wages, and
Ist is investment in sector s.
11 Furthermore, Lst denotes total sector s borrowing and r
l,s
t is the net
effective interest rate paid by firms in sector s. The law of motion for sectoral capital is given by
Kst = (1−δ )Kst−1+ Ist , and both capital and investment are produced out of the final good subject
to a sector-specific quadratic adjustment cost in investment; i.e., ϕ I,st = 12ϕ
IKst−1
(
Ist
Kst−1
−δ
)2
.
Firms need to borrow in order to finance their operating expenses; i.e., the wage bill and
investment. This setup follows Neumeyer and Perri (2005), who rationalize the wage bill pre-
financing need of firms through within-period loans by the timing structure of wage contracts and
firm production. We extend their argument along two dimensions. First, firms need to pre-finance
10The assumption that SMEs are all in the non-tradeable sector is inessential for our results and made here for
convenience. However, it is consistent with the observation in the trade literature that smaller, less productive, firms are
less likely to engage in international trade (Melitz (2003)). It is additionally supported by the results in the Survey of
Access to Finance by Enterprises (SAFE), according to which ca. 60% of the participating SMEs did not export any
goods or services in 2014, and 22% of the SMEs generate less than 25% of their turnover in foreign markets.
11We normalize the price of tradeable goods to unity in both countries.
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investment outlays, and second, loans need to be repaid after dividends have been distributed. This
makes firm loans intertemporal, which matches the timing of deposits and interbank loans in the
economy. The identity for external finance is thus
Lst =WtN
s
t +PtI
s
t .
Firms in both sectors have to bundle loans from global and local banks to satisfy their borrow-
ing needs. Specifically, we posit the following borrowing technology:
Lst =
(
τs
1
ν Ls,GBt
ν−1
ν +(1− τs) 1ν Ls,LBt
ν−1
ν
) ν
ν−1
,
where Ls,GBt and L
s,LB
t are sector s borrowing from global and local banks, respectively, and τs
captures the degree to which firms in sector s depend on local bank credit (lower τs translating
into higher dependence). Firms decide how much to borrow from global and local banks by mini-
mizing the expected repayment Lst
(
1+ rl,st
)
= Ls,GBt
(
1+ rl,s,GBt
)
+Ls,LBt
(
1+ rl,s,LBt
)
, subject to
the borrowing technology.12
This setup implies that loans from local and global banks are imperfect substitutes, with an
elasticity of substitution being captured by the parameter ν . This is meant to reflect that global
and local banks have different business models. Large international banks engage mainly in arm’s-
length lending, while local banks engage mainly in relationship-lending. During a long-term re-
lationship local banks acquire information about the small firm. This leads to the well-known
hold-up problem (Sharpe (1990) and Petersen and Rajan (1994)) and makes it difficult for the
borrowing firm to move away from the local bank. Therefore, loans from global and local banks
are imperfect substitutes from the point of view of the borrowing firm and compared to large
firms, SMEs are more dependent on local banks (τSME < τBF). The borrowing technology above
captures these features in a reduced form.
Banks In each country, there is a local (domestic) bank. Additionally, local households own a
constant fraction of the global bank. Local banks fund themselves by borrowing from global banks
and through deposits, while global banks have access to funds in a global money market (which
we do not model). This setup is meant to reflect the structure of the “double-decker” banking
integration that was characteristic for the Eurozone in the years before the crisis, as documented
by Bruno and Shin (2015b) and Hale and Obstfeld (2016). In particular, big French, German, and
Dutch banks borrowed in the U.S. money market, while Southern European local banks borrowed
short-term from the global northern European banks.
The local bank extends loans to small and large firms, LSME,LBt and L
BF,LB
t , and raises funds in
the European interbank market (Mt) and in the form of domestic deposits (Dt). Its balance sheet
identity is correspondingly given by:
LSME,LBt +L
BF,LB
t =Mt +Dt .
12A similar approach to modeling the demand for loans is used by Gerali et al. (2010). However, they do not
distinguish between different firm- or bank-types, which is one of the main distinct features of our model. Note also,
that under the CES assumption, effective funds available to firms for productive purposes (Lst ) are less than or equal
to the sum of loans extended to them by local and global banks (Ls,GBt +L
s,LB
t ). We interpret this discrepancy as an
implicit borrowing cost.
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The local bank is owned by domestic households and maximizes expected discounted profits.
Because the bank’s problem is effectively intratemporal, this amounts to maximizing (and fully
disbursing) its profits (ΠLBt ) each period:
max
LSME,LBt , L
BF,LB
t , Mt , Dt
ΠLBt ,
where ΠLBt = L
SME,LB
t r
l,SME,LB
t + L
BF,LB
t r
l,BF,LB
t −Mtrmt −Dtrdt −ϕLBt and rl,SME,LBt , rl,BF,LBt , rmt
and rdt denote interest rates on local bank loans to small and large firms, the interbank lending
rate, and the deposit rate, respectively. The last term, ϕLBt , is a quadratic “adjustment cost” in
deposits, modeled as a function of the relative deviation of deposits from their long-run value,
namely, ϕLBt = 12ϕ
LBD
(Dt−D
D
)2
. This term reflects the difficulty for banks to undergo short-term
changes in their funding structure and prevents unit-root dynamics in deposits and interbank loans,
known to be otherwise a feature of this type of models (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003)).
The global bank provides funds to small and large firms in both countries (LSME,GBt and L
BF,GB
t )
and additionally lends an amount Mt in the interbank market. It refinances itself through wholesale
funding, Bt , in the global interbank market, such that its balance sheet is given by:
LSME,GBt +L
SME,GB∗
t +L
BF,GB
t +L
BF,GB∗
t +Mt +M
∗
t = Bt ,
where an asterisk (*) indicates the foreign country. Its objective is to maximize total expected
discounted profits. The global bank’s problem is again intratemporal—as for the local bank—this
amounts to maximizing profits (ΠGBt ) each period:
max
LSME,GBt L
SME,GB∗
t ,L
BF,GB
t , L
BF,GB∗
t , M, M∗t , Bt
ΠGBt ,
whereΠGBt =
(
LSME,GBt +L
SME,GB∗
t
)
rl,SME,GBt +
(
LBF,GBt +L
BF,GB∗
t
)
rl,BF,GBt +(Mt +M∗t )rmt −Btrbt −
ϕGBt and where r
l,SME,GB
t and r
l,BF,GB
t denote interest rates on global bank loans to small and large
firms, respectively, rmt is the interbank lending rate, and r
b
t is the cost of financing in the global in-
terbank market. Because the global bank is owned in constant proportions by the home and foreign
households, total profits ΠGBt are disbursed to households in both countries based on ownership
shares µGB and µGB∗ = 1−µGB.13
The global bank is exposed to lending conditions in the rest of the world through exoge-
nous fluctuations in the supply of funds offered in the global money markets. In particular, a
drop in Bt raises the global interest rate rbt , which transmits to lending conditions to firms and
households in both countries. Adrian and Shin (2014) show that, at least in the years before the
crisis, global banks adjusted leverage mainly via changes in risk-weighted assets (RWA). We in-
troduce this concept into our model via the adjustment cost in the bank’s risk-weighted assets,
namely, ϕGBt = ϕGBRWA
(
RWAt−RWA
RWA
)2
, where we define the risk-weighted assets as RWAt =
γL
(
LSME,GBt +L
SME,GB∗
t +L
BF,GB
t +L
BF,GB∗
t
)
+γM (Mt +M∗t ), where γL and γM are the risk weight-
ings associated with real-sector and bank-to-bank loans, respectively, and where RWA denotes
13These ownership shares are calculated as long-run shares of revenues that the global bank earns in a respective
country, e.g., µGB = L
SME,GBrl,SME,GB+LBF,GBrl,BF,GB+Mrm
(LSME,GB+LSME,GB∗)rl,SME,GB+(LBF,GB+LBF,GB∗)rl,BF,GB+(M+M∗)rm
.
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risk-weighted assets in the steady-state. Given differences in risk weightings on different assets,
and in particular γL > γM, the global shock does not affect the interbank and real sector lend-
ing rates symmetrically, but causes a positive spread between them as the global bank rebalances
its asset side away from (notionally) low-risk interbank loans towards (notionally) high-risk real
sector loans.
The risk weights, γL and γM play a key role for the transmission of the global banking shock
in our model. Under Basel II regulation, real sector financing is considered to be riskier than
interbank loans or investments into highly-rated “risk-less” assets (among which mortgage-backed
securities or southern European sovereign bonds used to be counted before the crisis). This implies
that γL > γMand the bank will have a higher shadow cost of real sector-loans and demand a higher
interest rate. Assume that a global banking shock lets Bt shrink to zero. As the bank’s balance
sheet shrinks, it can shift lending to higher interest-rate real loans while still maintaining the level
of risk-weighted assets—cross-border lending to banks declines relative to real sector lending,
very much as we observe in the data.
Both global and local banks possess market power, as credit is extended to firms in a monopo-
listic competition environment. We do not explicitly model the microeconomic mechanism behind
it and refer the reader to any model in which a Dixit–Stiglitz framework is applied to the bank loan
market; e.g., Gerali et al. (2010). The implication of market power is that banks set mark-ups on
their cost of funds when they extend credit to large and small firms.
The optimal supply of credit, arising from local and global bank optimization problems given
the monopolistic competition and costly adjustment in risk-weighted assets is the following:
rl,SME,GBt =
(
rbt + γ
LϕGB
(
RWAt −RWA
RWA
))
×MUSME,
rl,BF,GBt =
(
rbt + γ
LϕGB
(
RWAt −RWA
RWA
))
×MUBF,
rmt = r
b
t + γ
MϕGB
(
RWAt −RWA
RWA
)
,
rl,SME,LBt = (r
m
t + lbst)×MUSME,
rl,BF,LBt = (r
m
t + lbst)×MUBF,
rdt = r
m
t + lbst −ϕLB
Dt −D
D
,
where MUSME and MUBF denote mark-ups applied to loans to SMEs and large firms, respectively,
and lbst is the exogenous local banking shock. We incorporate local banking shocks directly into
the optimality condition by imposing a country-specific wedge on the equilibrium interbank loan
rates demanded by the global bank. These shocks are mean-zero and potentially correlated across
countries and shift the respective loan supply schedules up. In particular, a positive local banking
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shock would result in local bank demanding higher interest rates from its borrowers, as its own
cost of funds rises. Due to mark-ups, the effective spread for the firms rises and they cut on
production, employment, investment and credit. The real effects of the local banking shocks are
most pronounced among firms that are particularly dependent on credit from local banks, namely
SMEs.
Households Households consume a bundle of tradeable and local non-tradeable goods, supply
labor to firms, and receive dividends (profits) from the firms and banks they own. They maximize
their lifetime utility given by:
max
{Ct , Nt , Dt}∞t=0
E0
[
∞
∑
t=0
β t
(
Ct1−σ −1
1−σ −Ψ
N1+ψt
1+ψ
)]
,
where β is the discount factor, σ is the coefficient of risk aversion, ψ is the inverse Frisch elasticity,
andΨ is the weight of labor disutility. Total labor, supplied by the household, is denoted by Nt and
is immobile across country borders, while Ct represents a CES aggregate of consumption of the
tradeable and non-tradeable goods (produced by large firms and SMEs, respectively), given by:
Ct =
(
ω
1
εCBFt
ε−1
ε +(1−ω) 1εCSMEt
ε−1
ε
) ε
ε−1
,
where ω expresses the household’s preference towards tradeable goods and therefore determines
relative sizes of the two sectors, and ε denotes the elasticity of substitution between the two goods.
The household’s flow budget constraint is given by
PtCt +Dt =WtNt +Dt−1(1+ rdt−1)+DIV
BF
t +DIV
SME
t +Π
LB
t−1+µ
GBΠGBt−1,
where Pt is the aggregate consumer-price index, Dt is the holding of household deposits earning
net interest rdt , and WtNt is the total wage received by the household.
An optimizing household responds to shocks to discount factor by adjusting its labor supply,
with associated equilibrium impacts on employment, output, and wages. In order to dampen these
effects such that the reactions to interest shocks matches the data, we introduce real wage rigidities
in a reduced form as proposed by Blanchard and Galí (2007), as follows:
log
(
Wt
Pt
)
= γ log
(
Wt−1
Pt−1
)
+(1− γ) logMRSt ,
where MRSt is the implied marginal rate of substitution, arising from optimal choice of labor by
the household; i.e., MRSt =ΨN
ψ
t Cσt , and γ is the persistence parameter, which can be interpreted
as an index of real rigidities. This rigidity in real wages prevents an over-reaction of wages and
employment and achieves an empirically consistent negative response of labor and output to an
interest rate shock for a wide range of parameters.
Market clearing Local markets for non-tradeable (SME-produced) goods clear according to:
Y SMEt = (1−ω)
(
PSMEt
Pt
)−ε (
Ct + It +Γt
)
,
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where Γt is total net real costs present in the model, which therefore can be thought of as part of
gross real investment.14
The tradeable goods market clears according to:
YBFt = ω
(
PBFt
Pt
)−ε (
Ct + It +Γt
)
+
NXt
PBFt
,
Total net exports to rest of the world (from both home and foreign countries) are given by NXt +
NX∗t = Bt−1(1+ rbt )−Bt .
Market clearing conditions for the factor markets are given by Kt = KBFt +K
SME
t , It = I
BF
t +
ISMEt and Nt = N
BF
t +N
SME
t .
Definitions Aggregate real GDP in the model is given by
Yt =
PBFt
Pt
YBFt +
PSMEt
Pt
Y SMEt .
The SME share in the economy is then
SMEt =
PSMEt Y
SME
t
PtYt
,
with SME≈ 1−ω in the steady-state.
Domestic bank dependence is defined as the ratio of locally originated loans to total loans to
private sector in the economy:
DBD =
LLB
LLB+LGB
.
Mapping the model to the data
Calibration We normalize the size of GDP for each “home” economy to 1 and calibrate the
baseline model at the quarterly frequency using parameter values displayed in Table 3. And be-
cause the “foreign” country represents “the rest of the EMU,” we normalize its GDP to 10; i.e., the
number of countries in the sample minus one. We additionally calibrate steady-state SME shares
and domestic bank dependence for 11 countries in our sample as shown in Table 4. The model is
then solved by log-linearizing around the deterministic steady-state.
The model counterpart of the global banking shock in our regressions, ∆GBSt , is constructed
as follows. We first simulate the model for all 11 countries in our sample to obtain artificial data
on cross-border bank-to-bank lending Mt and cross-border real sector lending LGBt (both for the
“home” country). Given this data, we proceed in the same fashion as in the empirical section by
calculating (the negative of) the difference between growth rates of aggregate cross-border lending
to banks and cross-border lending to firms (where c indexes the country):
∆GBSt =−
[
∆ log
(
11
∑
c=1
Mct
)
−∆ log
(
11
∑
c=1
LGB,ct
)]
.
14In our model, Γt is composed of implicit firm borrowing costs
(
LSME,GBt +L
SME,LB
t −LSMEt
)
+(
LBF,GBt +L
BF,LB
t −LBFt
)
, and all (second-order) adjustment costs.
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Some of the parameters have been calibrated to standard values common in the literature.
Households’ discount factor β is set to 0.99, to match the steady-state quarterly net deposit rate
of 1%. The household’s coefficient of relative risk aversion σ is one, such that its instantaneous
utility function is logarithmic with respect to the consumption bundle. The inverse of the Frisch
elasticity ψ in the utility function is set to 2, while the scale parameter Ψ is determined by the
steady-state restrictions. We assume a Cobb-Douglas specification for the consumption aggregate
by setting the elasticity of substitution between tradeable and non-tradeable goods in consumption
(ε) to 1. The household preference parameter ω is then implicitly pinned down by the share of
SMEs in a given economy.
The production functions of large and small firms are Cobb-Douglas with the capital intensity
parameter αs equal to 0.35 for each firm, which corresponds to a long-term share of capital in
production in advanced economies. We set the capital depreciation parameter δ to 0.025, and the
investment adjustment cost parameter ϕ I to 2. The index of real wage rigidities, γ , is set to 0.85 in
order to match the business cycle moments for hours worked and is consistent with Blanchard and
Galí (2007). We choose mark-ups of 3.5 and 2.5 for the loans extended to small and large firms,
respectively. These values are in line with the calibration in Gerali et al. (2010), who use the value
of 3.12, while we choose a larger mark-up for loans to small firms than for loans to large firms.
As to the risk-weights of the global bank, we assume that the regulator chooses higher risk
weights for credit extended to the real sector than for interbank loans. Because claims on corpo-
rations are associated with risk weights ranging from 20% for firms with AAA to AA- ratings to
100% for unrated firms or those with low rating (BBB+ to BB-), to 150% for firms with ratings
below BB-, and depend on a range of additional criteria, including the quality of collateral, we
assume that an average loan to a big firm receives the same weight attached to it as a loan to a
small firm, equal to 75%. This value is applied to loans to small businesses within regulatory retail
portfolios in Basel II rules, and at the same time lies in the middle field within range of applied
weights to rated and unrated corporations as described above. For bank-to-bank credit, we choose
the weight 35%, which is a simple average of weights applied to loans to banks with AAA to
AA- ratings (20%) and those with A+ to A- ratings (50%), and at the same time is used to weight
claims secured by residential property, which was a common way of obtaining interbank liquidity
through repo agreements prior to the crisis.
The next step in our calibration is choosing values for adjustment cost parameters for local and
global banks. The first (ϕLB) is set to 0.01, which allows us to match the consumption moments to
the data. It also prevents perfect substitutability of interbank loans for deposits, especially in times
of global downturns. As the cost is proportional to the percentage deviation of deposits from the
steady-state, we choose the same steady-state value for deposits (relative to GDP) for all countries,
at the value of 0.2. We set the second adjustment cost parameter (ϕGB) to the value of 2, such that
the degree of substitutability between global bank real sector and interbank loans is high enough
to manifest itself in a significantly higher contemporaneous drop of interbank loans in the crisis as
a consequence of a negative banking shock.
We set the value for the elasticity of substitution between loans from local and global banks of
firms (ν) to 0.5, implying that firms treat these loans as complements, but still allow for imperfect
correlation between them. This choice is consistent with our interpretation of firms borrowing
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technology as arising from hold-up problems due to relationship lending.
The corresponding CES preference parameters τSME and τBF are chosen to exactly match the
model-implied DBD parameter to that obtained from the data, given the country-specific SME shares.
In particular, the following approximation holds in the steady state: DBD ≈ SME× (1− τSME)+
(1− SME)×(1− τBF).15 Because we lack sectoral data allowing us to calibrate sectoral parameters
τ directly, we assume that the domestic bank dependence of high-SME sectors in every country
is a constant multiplier on the domestic bank dependence of the low-SME sectors. In particular,
assuming
(
1− τSME) = 1.5× (1− τBF), allows us to calibrate sectoral local bank dependencies
for every country in the range of (0, 1).16
Forcing variables There are three major sources of shocks in our setup: shocks to total factor
productivity (both high and low SME sectors), shocks to local banks, and shocks to the global
bank. The TFP processes for any country c (one for each sector s) are given by the following
equations. For a home country (representing the simulation country c):
logθ st = ρ
θ logθ st−1−σ s
ρ†
α†
ηs,†t +
√
1−
(
ρ†
α†
)2
ηst
 ,
and for a foreign country (representing “rest-of-EMU”):
logθ s∗t = ρ
θ logθ s∗t−1−α†σ sηs,†t .
Similarly, the local banking shocks for both countries are as follows. For a home country
(representing the simulation country c):
lbst = ρ lbslbst−1+σ lbs
ρ†
α†
η lbs,†t +
√
1−
(
ρ†
α†
)2
η lbst
 , (6)
and for a foreign country (representing “rest-of-EMU”):
lbs∗t = ρ
lbslbs∗t−1+α
†σ lbsη lbs,†t . (7)
The stochastic process for the global banking shock has the same realization for every country
and is given by
logBt = (1−ρgbs) logB+ρgbs logBt−1−σgbsηgbst .
In the setup above, ηst , η
s,†
t , η lbst , η
lbs,†
t , η
gbs
t
i.i.d.∼ N (0, 1), and correspond, respectively,
to idiosyncratic home-country sectoral TFP shocks, rest-of-the-EMU sectoral TFP shocks, id-
iosyncratic home-country local banking shocks, rest-of-the-EMU local banking shocks, and global
15DBD = L
LB
LLB+LGB
= L
SME
LLB+LGB
× LLB,SME
LSME
+ L
BF
LLB+LGB
× LLB,BF
LBF
≈ SME× (1− τSME)+(1− SME)× (1− τBF).
16A potential alternative calibration assuming a constant value of domestic bank dependence for one of the sectors
across all countries would need infeasible values outside the range of (0, 1) for at least one country in order to match
the data.
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(EMU-wide) banking shocks. All exogenous processes follow autoregressive dynamics with per-
sistence parameters ρθ and ρgbs equal to 0.95, and ρ lbs equal to 0.80. The cross-country correla-
tion between shocks is ρ† = 0.25. Given this correlation structure, the variance of the rest-of-the-
EMU shocks are scaled by a parameter α†, which also enters the stochastic processes of the home
country. This parameter is defined for each simulation country c as follows: α†c = (ω ′cΩωc)
1
2 ,
where ωc = vec
(
GDPj
∑ j 6=cGDPj
)
and Ω=

1 · · · ρ†
...
. . .
...
ρ† · · · 1
.
The standard deviation of the global banking shock (σgbs) is then set to 0.02 to match the
volatility of the simulated ∆GBSt measure for a series of the standard normal shocks that allows to
reconstruct the empirically observed series in the model, given the rest of the calibrated parame-
ters. The volatility of the local banking shocks (σ lbs) is set to 0.0025. It provides a comparable
magnitude of the real effects of the local banking shocks, but at the same time does not bias the
business cycle moments from the model-simulated data, that we briefly discuss below. Given these
values and in order to match the standard deviation of the real GDP that we find in the data, the
standard deviation of the TFP shocks σθ is set to 0.0125.
Business cycle properties The business cycle properties of the calibrated model are given in
Table 5. The first two columns present statistics for model simulations calibrated for Austria,
which is typical for the countries in our sample in terms of SME and DBD, while the last two
columns contain the respective data-counterparts, calculated for EMU-11 countries using data
from Eurostat. For each variable in the table, we present the standard deviations relative to the
standard deviation of GDP (except for net exports, which is a standard deviation of net exports-
to-lagged-GDP ratio in percentage points) and correlation with domestic GDP of consumption,
investment, employment, net exports and GDP (absolute standard deviation in percentage points).
All model statistics are obtained from 1000 simulations with all shocks switched on and over 250
quarters, with the first 50 quarters dropped. All real data statistics are obtained from applying the
HP-filter to variables in logarithms for the sample 1996Q1–2017Q4. To avoid that the HP-filter
induces extreme values at either end of the sample and in order to focus on the pre-crisis period,
we use the sample 1999Q1–2007Q4 to calculate the empirical moments.
The model matches almost all the data-statistics well in terms of standard deviations and cor-
relations with GDP. The exceptions are investment and net exports-GDP ratio volatility, which are
somewhat too high in the model for the Austria calibration.
6 Quantitative results
6.1 Matching the empirical regressions
We evaluate the ability of the model to fit the data by asking whether it can replicate the empirical
findings in Tables 1 and 2, which motivated this study. To this end, we generate artificial data from
the model and run the same regressions that we performed on the empirical data on the simulated
data. Because our actual data set comprises 11 countries, we calibrate the model for 11 countries,
matching the pre-2008 average domestic bank dependence and 2008 SME share (see Table 4).
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We simulate the data for 60 quarters by calibrating global bank shocks (ηgbst ) to closely match
the observed dynamics of our empirical ∆GBS measure prior to and during the crisis. As with the
real data, we calculate annual growth rates of real per capita sectoral GVA by taking differences
between quarter t and t−4, so that ∆ log GVAc,st = log GVAc,st − log GVAc,st−4.
Table 6 presents two sets of regression results corresponding to our main empirical specifica-
tion (4) (summarized in Table 2), and obtained from 10000 realizations of the scenarios described
above. The output of the panel transmission regression on country-sector level, in which the de-
pendent variable corresponds to sectoral value added growth, are presented in column (1). Further,
column (2) replicates the before-after (cross-sectional) analysis, in which the dependent variable
is the change of average sectoral output growth between the pre-2008 and the post-2008 periods.
We demean all variables cross-sectionally (except for the sector indicator variable SMEc,s) and in-
clude country-sector and time-sector fixed effects in the regression in column (1), and sector fixed
effects in the regression in column (2). For each simulation we run the regressions, save the esti-
mated coefficients, and use their distribution to construct the reported regression coefficients and
t-statistics. In each simulation run, we draw new local banking shocks and global, country and
sector-specific TFP shocks.
In Table 6, the interaction term ∆GBSt× SMEc,s×DBDc, which captures any interaction between
SME-share and domestic banking dependence, is negative and highly significant in the country-
sector transmission regression in column (1). Moreover, we find a clear negative link between
growth and domestic bank dependence in SME sectors across countries as supported by the results
in column (2). The evidence from the before-after country-sector regression in column (2) is
visualized in Figure 8 (cf. Figure 5): The slope is negative for SME firms and is much weaker for
the sectors populated by large firms.
Quantitatively, our model-implied results from sectoral regressions of crisis transmission come
close to the empirical findings in Table 2 (see column (4), which utilizes a dummy for high/low
SME dependence). The interaction term (α1) are highly significant and compare as−0.47 (model)
against −0.43 (data). The same is true with regard to the before-after cross-sectional regression
results. Although the coefficient on the interaction term in the empirical specifications in Table 2
(column (6) with high/low SME coding) (–0.10) is larger in absolute value than the coefficient
implied by the model-simulated data (−0.03), they compare well and consistently point in the
same direction.
We complement our findings with results from local linear projection regressions (5) using
model-simulated data and standardized ∆GBSt measure, separately for SME and non-SME sec-
tors. These results are summarized in Figure 9. They closely mimic the local linear projections
estimated from the data that we reported in Figure 6.
6.2 Using the model to assess challenges to identification
Our model simulations allow us to match the empirical regressions in Tables 1 and 2. Our setup
so far assumed that the decline in cross-border bank-to-bank lending is driven by a shock to the
balance sheet of global banks, which fits a narrative of the banking crises emanating from the
United States. This raises the question to what extent other shock constellations could generate
patterns similar to what we observe in the data.
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For example, our interpretation of the banking shock as capturing credit supply to SMEs could
be questioned, if there was a common (across countries) reduction in demand for loans that par-
ticularly affected countries with high domestic bank dependence and sectors with many SMEs. If
that were the case, cov(δ c,s, DBDc× SMEc,s) might be non-zero. Because such a negative credit de-
mand shock would also be correlated with ∆GBSt , our identification assumption would be violated.
In the same vein, one might conjecture that shocks to local banks that occurred simultaneously in
the crisis countries could be driving our results.
To address this possibility, we simulate data from the model under three scenarios: first, a
scenario with a global (i.e., common across countries) TFP shock in the SME sector. Second,
a scenario with local correlated TFP shocks to the SME sectors in crisis countries and, third, a
scenario with local correlated banking sector shocks in the crisis countries. In all three scenarios,
the global banking sector shock is switched off and all other shocks for the non-crisis countries are
assumed to be uncorrelated. Using the simulated data, we re-run our main regression (4) to assess
how our coefficient of interest, α1, would be affected.17 Table 6 presents the results.
None of the counterfactuals delivers a negative significant coefficient to the interaction term
∆GBSt × SMEc,s×DBDc. If all countries experience simultaneous declines in the productivity of the
high-SME sectors (counterfactual in column 1), the coefficient of interest is in fact positive. This
result is due to the fact that while SME sectors are slightly more affected in high DBD countries
(see row 1, column (3) in Figure 7, which plots the theoretical impulse responses to the shocks we
discuss; see below), the B2B-over-B2N loans ratio increases. This effect seems to weaken (and
even reverse) if instead, see column (2), only the set of crisis countries—Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, and Spain—are hit by TFP shocks. The coefficient of the interaction term is negative,
but close to zero and imprecisely estimated. Synchronized shocks to the local banking sector in the
crisis countries, as shown in column (3) of Figure 7, induce a negative coefficient of a magnitude
comparable to our baseline findings. This is consistent with the fact that the transmission of the
global banking shock is similar to the transmission of the local banking shock in the model (confer
columns (1) and (2) in Figure 7). However, because only a set of all countries is hit by the shocks
and because the measure of the shock that we construct—∆GBSt— is based on the growth rate of
the average of bank flows of all countries in the sample, the global crisis proxy gets very noisy
and leads to a high dispersion of the distribution of the simulated coefficients. In an empirical
sample, this would lead us to reject the hypothesis that the global shock affects high SME sectors
disproportionately in high DBD countries.
We conclude that, although all scenarios that we describe above could lead to a bias in the
effect that we study, none of them delivers an alternative that fits the data. Only when we include
a shock to the global banking sector do we find a large significant differential effect of the variable
∆GBSt on growth of sectoral value added.
Impulse responses: shock transmission To shed more light on the economic mechanisms that
drive the results in Tables 6 and 7, Figure 7 displays impulse responses for small firm production,
large firm production, bank-to-bank lending, and bank-to-bank over bank-to-non-bank lending.
17In order for the local shocks in the second and third scenario to cause the estimate of α1 to be significant, the shocks
need to be correlated across crisis countries. Uncorrelated local shocks in all countries by construction are uncorrelated
with ∆GBSt and will not affect our results.
20
The impulse responses are plotted for the model calibrated to the domestic bank dependence and
small-firm share of Austria and Greece, respectively, as well as a counterfactual calibration for
“Greece,” where domestic banking dependence has been adjusted to the low level of Belgium.
The effect of a one standard deviation (2 percent) global banking shock—shock to interbank
funds—is quite severe for a country with domestic banking dependence and small-firm share at
the level of Greece, for which it causes more than a 1.5 percent drop in the production of small
firms on impact. The effect is smaller for a country like Austria and not very large for Greece if
the domestic banking dependence had been similar to that of Belgium. Large firms, in the second
row of figures, increase production but with little difference between the parametrizations. The
third row shows the decline in bank-to-bank lending and the fourth row the decline in bank-to-
bank lending over bank-to-real-sector lending. Both plummet on impact and remain low for many
quarters ahead, with the magnitude of the decline between 5 and 8 percent.
The mechanics of the model is that a reduction in the size of the balance sheet of the global
bank leads the bank to adjusts its portfolio by investing relatively more in the real sector by pro-
viding more funds to firms and relatively less funds to local banks. This is because the latter carry
a lower regulatory risk weight. Consequently, cross-border bank-to-bank credit falls more than
bank-to-real sector credit, and local banks experience a shock to their liabilities making them re-
duce real sector lending. As a result, firms experience a more-than-proportional decrease in loan
supply from local banks compared to global banks. Because SMEs are more dependent on local
credit than big firms are, they adjust their production plans by reducing labor input and investment
more than big firms. Large firms produce tradeable goods and the global banking shock induces a
rise in domestic net exports and they benefit from the global bank shocks.
A local banking shock hurts small firms and this effect is larger if the country is dependent on
domestic banks as seen for the Greece calibration in the middle column of figures. Large firms
initially benefit, but after four quarter their production declines. Bank-to-bank lending declines
and only slowly recovers. The impulse responses for a global TFP shock in SME sectors are
plotted in column (3) of Figure 7, while the last column shows the transmission of the local TFP
shocks in SME sectors. TFP shocks affect both large and small firms and “Austrian” and “Greek”
large firms are similarly affected. However, small firms are hit slightly harder when the country is
dependent on local banks even if bank-to-bank (over bank-to-non-bank) lending actually increases.
Overall, the impulse response functions clearly point to the mechanism that we want to draw
attention to: the combination of domestic banking dependence and a large SME-sector leaves a
country vulnerable to banking shocks, whether local or in the form of global liquidity shocks.
7 Conclusion
Small and medium-sized businesses have little access to outside capital, making their production
vulnerable to banking shocks. The results in this paper show that sectors (and economies) with
many small firms were less exposed to the recent crisis in the Eurozone in countries where they
had access to credit from foreign banks rather than from purely domestic banks. We argue that
banking integration in the Eurozone in the years before 2008 was of the “wrong” kind in the sense
that it was driven by lending from international banks to domestic banks, rather than by lending
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from international banks to the real economy. As we have shown empirically (using reduced-form
regressions) and theoretically (in a DSGE model), this left local SMEs highly dependent on the
domestic banking sector which in turn (due to short-term bank-to-bank lending) was vulnerable to
the global banking sector shock.
Our findings have some interesting policy implications. Banking integration in Europe may
require a “reset” that involves cross-border mergers between banks and consolidation of branch
networks by retail banks across country-borders in the Eurozone, as happened in the United States
after the state liberalization of state-level banking in the 1980s. In this way, international banks
could operate genuine internal capital markets across national borders, allocating funds to bank-
dependent SMEs in a recession.
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Table 1: Domestic Bank Dependence, SME shares and crisis transmission
Sector-country level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Growth in sectoral value added
∆GBSt × SMEs×DBD −1.32∗∗∗ −1.24∗∗∗ −1.04∗∗ −0.97∗∗
(−3.23) (−3.04) (−2.13) (−2.08)
∆GBSt × SMEs 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13
(1.24) (1.37) (1.26) (1.39)
∆GBSt ×DBD −0.25 −0.11 0.02 0.15∗∗
(−1.04) (−0.53) (0.16) (2.51)
∆GBSt ×CORE 0.10∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(3.02) (3.51)
∆GBSt ×GREECE −0.24∗∗∗ −0.23∗∗∗
(−4.88) (−4.92)
Observations 4,224 4,224 4,224 4,224
Adjusted R2 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.28
NOTES: The table presents estimates of our baseline specification:
∆ log GVAc,st = ∆GBSt × [α1DBDc× SMEc,s+α2SMEc,s+α3DBDc]+CONTROLS+ τt +µc,s+ εc,st .
Regressions include time and country-sector effects. Standard errors are clustered by country and time,
t-statistics are in parentheses. Columns 2-4 include an interaction of the ∆GBSt indicator with a dummy for
the core economies and/or for Greece. The sample includes 66 country-sectors, six in each of the 11 EMU
countries Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal,
and Spain. The core economies are Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. The sample period is
1997Q1-2013Q4.
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Table 3: Model calibration
Parameter Description Value
β Households’ discount factor 0.99
ψ Inverse of Frisch elasticity 2
σ Households’ risk aversion 1
ε Elasticity of substitution between tradeable and non-tradeable goods 1
γ Index of real wage rigidities 0.80
αBF Capital intensity in BFs’ production function 0.35
αSME Capital intensity in SMEs’ production function 0.35
ϕ I Investment adjustment cost parameter 2
δ Capital depreciation 0.025
ν Firms’ elasticity of substitution between GB and LB loans 0.5
MUBF Mark-up on BF’s credit rates 2.5
MUSME Mark-up on SME’s credit rates 3.5
ϕLB Local bank adjustment cost in deposits 0.01
ϕGB Global bank adjustment cost in risk-weighted assets 2
D/GDP Steady state ratio of deposits to GDP 0.2
γL Risk weight on credit to real sector 0.75
γM Risk weight on interbank credit 0.35
ρθ TFP shocks autocorrelation coefficient 0.95
ρgbs Global banking shock autocorrelation coefficient 0.95
ρ lbs Local banking shock autocorrelation coefficient 0.80
σθ Standard deviation of TFP shocks 0.0125
σgbs Standard deviation of global banking shock 0.02
σ lbs Standard deviation of local banking shock 0.0025
ρ† International correlation of TFP shocks 0.25
NOTES: Additionally, we calibrate home and foreign nominal SME share and DBD parameters (see Ta-
ble 4). These parameters implicitly determine the values of other model parameters ω , τ , and Ψ.
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Table 4: Calibration of SME and DBD for EMU-11 countries
SME DBD
Austria 0.60 0.68
Belgium 0.59 0.46
Finland 0.54 0.44
France 0.60 0.54
Germany 0.52 0.78
Greece 0.64 0.85
Ireland 0.54 0.62
Italy 0.71 0.73
Netherlands 0.64 0.51
Portugal 0.68 0.68
Spain 0.67 0.75
EMU 0.61 0.67
NOTES: The values for DBD are constructed as pre-2008 within-country averages, while the 2008 data are
used to construct the values for SME.
Table 5: Business cycle properties of the model
Austria Data
St.Dev. Corr. St.Dev. Corr.
GDP 1.60∗ 1.59∗
Consumption 0.65 0.69 0.64 0.74
Investment 4.96 0.65 2.85 0.82
Employment 0.58 0.79 0.62 0.75
Net exports 2.35 –0.09 1.09 –0.26
NOTES: The table reports theoretical and empirical standard deviations (“St.Dev.”) and correlations
(“Corr.”) of the variables. The theoretical moments are shown for Austria, which is the “representative”
country in our sample. The empirical moments are averages across 11 countries in our sample: Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. All statistics
are obtained from applying the HP-filter to variables in logarithms for the sample 1996Q1–2017Q4. To
avoid HP-filter induced beginning-of-sample extreme values and to focus on the pre-crisis period, we use
the sample 1999Q1–2007Q4 to calculate the empirical moments. Standard deviations are the ratio of the
standard deviation to the standard deviation of GDP (except for net exports, which is the standard deviation
of net exports-to-GDP ratio in percentage points). All model statistics are obtained from 1000 simulations
with all shocks switched on, over 250 quarters, with the first 50 quarters dropped.
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Table 6: Domestic bank dependence, SME-sectors, and crisis transmission: Baseline
model simulation results
(1) (2)
Growth in sectoral value added Pre-/post crisis change in avg. growth rate
SMEs×DBD×∆GBS –0.467
∗∗∗
(–2.713)
DBD×∆GBS 0.082
(0.769)
SMEs×DBD –0.033
(–0.919)
DBD
–0.003
(–0.106)
N 1408 22
NOTES: The table presents estimates of our baseline specification in column (1) and the cross-sectional
before-after analysis in column (2).
In column (1), we estimate the following specification:
∆ log GVAc,st = ∆GBSt × [α1DBDc× SMEc,s+α2DBDc]+µ t,s+µc,s+ εc,st .
This regression includes time-sector and country-sector fixed effects. The term ∆GBSt × SMEc,s is absorbed
by time-sector fixed effects, since in the model SMEc,s only varies across sectors, but not across countries.
In column (2), we estimate the following specification:
∆ log GVAc,scrisis−∆ log GVAc,spre−crisis = α1DBDc× SMEc,s+α2DBDc+µs+ εc,s.
This regression includes sector fixed effects. The term SMEc,s is absorbed by sector fixed effects, since in
the model SMEc,s only varies across sectors, but not across countries.
Estimated coefficients and t-stats (in parentheses) are derived from sample means and standard deviations of
the simulated regression coefficients. In particular, for every of 10000 simulations, we run the regressions,
save the estimated coefficients, and use their distribution to construct the reported values. The model has
been calibrated for 11 EMU countries. We obtained time series over 60 quarters for each of the simulated
variables. All variables have been cross-sectionally demeaned. Statistical significance at 1/5/10 percent
level is denoted by ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗, respectively.
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Figure 1: Cross-border bank lending in selected Eurozone countries
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lending by foreign banks to the domestic non-bank sector (including governments). The source is
BIS locational banking statistics database.
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Figure 5: Post-2008 sector-level growth and domestic bank dependence: Sectors with
low vs. high SME shares
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NOTES: The graph plots the change in output from pre-2008 to post-2008 average growth rates at
the country-sector level against the average pre-2008 level of domestic bank dependence in each
country. Blue (red) diamonds (circles) indicate country-sectors with below (above) median SME
shares. The blue, dashed (red, solid) lines indicate the regression relationship between growth
and domestic bank dependence for the sample of blue (red) diamonds (circles). The observation
period is 1997Q1-2013Q4 for the 11 EMU countries Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
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Figure 6: Global banking shock and domestic bank dependence in sectors with low vs.
high SME shares: Local linear projections
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NOTES: The graph plots the cumulative effect of the interaction terms CRISISt ×DBDc from local
linear projection regressions, separately for high-SME sectors (red) and low-SME sectors (blue).
Different horizons (zero to four years) are on the x-axis, and the coefficients αh is on the y-
axis.. Colored shaded areas correspond to the respective 90% confidence bands. The observation
period is 1997Q1-2013Q4 for the 11 EMU countries Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
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Figure 7: Model impulse responses to a global banking shock, a local banking shock, a
global SME TFP shock and a local SME TFP shock
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NOTES: The graph plots the model impulse response functions of SME production, big firms pro-
duction, bank-to-bank loans and B2B-to-B2N ratio (rows) for “Greece” (red solid lines), “Austria”
(blue dashed lines) and “Greece (Counterfactual)” (green dot-dashed lines) to a one standard de-
viation global banking shock, local banking shock, global SME TFP shock and local SME TFP
shock (columns). “Greece” and “Austria” impulse responses are generated from models simulated
using parameter values from Table 4. “Greece (Counterfactual)” illustrates the counterfactual sce-
nario for Greece, in which we calibrate the model for Greece (e.g., the SME share), but set the
DBD parameter to its value for Belgium. All impulse responses are percentage deviations from
steady state. Number of quarters following the shock is on the x-axis.
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Figure 8: Post-2008 sector-level growth and domestic bank dependence in sectors with
low vs. high SME shares: Model simulation results
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NOTES: The graph plots the change in output from “pre-crisis” to “crisis” average growth rates
at the country-sector level against the steady-state level of domestic bank dependence in each
country. Blue (red) diamonds (circles) indicate BF (SME) sectors. The blue, dashed (red, solid)
lines indicate the regression relationship between growth and domestic bank dependence for the
sample of blue (red) diamonds (circles). Data and line slopes are obtained from 1000 model
simulations, calibrated for 11 EMU countries and run over 60 quarters, including 20 quarters of
the “crisis” period.
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Figure 9: Global banking shock and domestic bank dependence in sectors with low vs.
high SME shares: Model simulation results using local linear projections
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NOTES: The graph plots the cumulative effect of the interaction terms ∆GBSt × DBDc from local
linear projection regressions on model-simulated data, separately for SME sectors (red) and non-
SME sectors (blue). Different horizons (zero to four years) are on the x-axis, and the coefficients
αh is on the y-axis. Colored shaded areas correspond to the respective 90% confidence bands, cal-
culated from the distribution of the estimated coefficients across model simulations. The impulse
responses are obtained from 1000 model simulations, calibrated for 11 EMU countries and run
over 60 quarters, including 20 quarters of the “crisis” period.
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A Model equations
Households
Households objective:
max
{Ct , Nt , Dt}∞t=0
E0
[
∞
∑
t=0
β t
(
Ct1−σ −1
1−σ −Ψ
N1+ψt
1+ψ
)]
(s.t.) Intertemporal budget constraint
PtCt +Dt =WtNt +Dt−1(1+ rdt−1)+DIV
BF
t +DIV
SME
t +Π
LB
t−1+µ
GBΠGBt−1 (A.1)
SDF (FOC w.r.t. Ct):
Λt:t+1 = Et
[
β
Pt
Pt+1
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−σ]
(A.2)
FOC w.r.t. Nt including real wage rigidity (Blanchard & Gali (JMBC 2007)):
log
(
Wt
Pt
)
= γ log
(
Wt−1
Pt−1
)
+(1− γ) log(ΨNtψCtσ ) (A.3)
FOC w.r.t. Dt :
Et
[
Λt:t+1(1+ rdt )
]
= 1 (A.4)
Minimization problem:
min
{CBFt , CSMEt }
PtCt = PSMEt C
SME
t +P
BF
t C
BF
t
(s.t.) Consumption bundle:
Ct =
(
ω
1
εCBFt
ε−1
ε +(1−ω) 1εCSMEt
ε−1
ε
) ε
ε−1
(A.5)
Cost minimization w.r.t. CBFt :
CBFt = ω
(
PBFt
Pt
)−ε
Ct (A.6)
Cost minimization w.r.t. CSMEt :
CSMEt = (1−ω)
(
PSMEt
Pt
)−ε
Ct (A.7)
Implied price index (for reference):
Pt =
(
ωPBFt
1−ε
+(1−ω)PSMEt 1−ε
) 1
1−ε
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Firms
Firms objective:
max
{Nst , Kst , Lst }∞t=0
E0
[ ∞
∑
t=0
Λ0:tDIVst
]
Dividends:
DIVst = P
s
t Y
s
t −WtNst −Pt
(
Ist +
1
2
ϕ IKst−1
(
Ist
Kst−1
−δ
)2)
+Lst −Lst−1
(
1+ rl,st−1
)
(A.8)
Production function:
Y st = θ
s
t (K
s
t−1)
αs(Nst )
1−αs (A.9)
Capital law of motion:
Kst = (1−δ )Kst−1+ Ist (A.10)
Financing demand (with Ξst as Lagrange multiplier):
Lst =WtN
s
t +PtI
s
t (A.11)
FOC w.r.t. Nt :
Wt(1+Ξst ) = P
s
t (1−αs)
Y st
Nst
(A.12)
FOC w.r.t. Kt :
Qst = Et
[
Λt:t+1
(
Pst+1α
sY
s
t+1
Kst
+(1−δ )Qst+1
)]
(A.13)
FOC w.r.t. It (Tobin’s Q):
Qst
Pt
= 1+ϕ I
(
Ist
Kst−1
−δ
)
(A.14)
FOC w.r.t. Lst :
1+Ξst = Et
[
Λt:t+1(1+ rl,st )
]
(A.15)
Minimization problem:
min
{Ls,GBt , Ls,LBt }
Lst (1+ r
l,s
t ) = L
s,GB
t (1+ r
l,s,GB
t )+L
s,LB
t (1+ r
l,s,LB
t )
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(s.t.) Borrowing technology:
Lst =
(
τs
1
ν Ls,GBt
ν−1
ν +(1− τs) 1ν Ls,LBt
ν−1
ν
) ν
ν−1
(A.16)
Cost minimization w.r.t. Ls,GBt :
Ls,GBt = τs
(
1+ rl,s,GBt
1+ rl,st
)−ν
Lst (A.17)
Cost minimization w.r.t. Ls,LBt :
Ls,LBt = (1− τs)
(
1+ rl,s,LBt
1+ rl,st
)−ν
Lst (A.18)
Effective interest rate:
1+ rl,st =
(
τs
(
1+ rl,s,GBt
)1−ν
+(1− τs)
(
1+ rl,s,LBt
)1−ν) 11−ν
Local Bank
Local bank objective:
max
LLB,SMEt , L
LB,BF
t , Dt , Mt
ΠLBt
Balance sheet:
LLBt =Mt +Dt (A.19)
Profits (accruing in the beginning of next period):
ΠLBt = L
SME,LB
t r
l,SME,LB
t +L
BF,LB
t r
l,BF,LB
t −Mtrmt −Dtrdt −
1
2
ϕLBD
(
Dt −D
D
)2
(A.20)
FOC w.r.t. Dt (comb. with FOC w.r.t. Mt ):
rdt = r
m
t + lbst −ϕLB
Dt −D
D
(A.21)
FOC w.r.t. LSME,LBt (comb. with FOC w.r.t. Mt ):
rl,SME,LBt = (r
m
t + lbst)MU
SME (A.22)
FOC w.r.t. LBF,LBt (comb. with FOC w.r.t. Mt ):
rl,BF,LBt = (r
m
t + lbst)MU
BF (A.23)
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Composition of loans to firms:
LLBt = L
SME,LB+LBF,LB (A.24)
Global Bank
Global bank objective:
max
LGB,SMEt , L
GB,SME∗
t , L
GB,BF
t , L
GB,BF∗
t , Mt , M∗t , Bt
ΠGBt
Balance sheet:
LGBt +L
GB∗
t +Mt +M
∗
t = Bt (A.25)
Profits (accruing in the beginning of next period):
ΠGBt =
(
LBF,GBt +L
BF,GB∗
t
)
rl,BF,GBt +
(
LSME,GBt +L
SME,GB∗
t
)
rl,SME,GBt +(Mt +M
∗
t )r
m
t
−Btrb− 12ϕ
GBRWA
(
RWAt −RWA
RWA
)2
(A.26)
Risk-weighted assets definition:
RWAt = γL
(
LGBt +L
GB∗
t
)
+ γM (Mt +M∗t )
FOC w.r.t. LSME,GB(∗)t (comb. with FOC w.r.t. Bt ):
rl,SME,GBt =
(
rbt + γ
LϕGB
(
RWAt −RWA
RWA
))
MUSME (A.27)
FOC w.r.t. LBF,GB(∗)t (comb. with FOC w.r.t. Bt ):
rl,BF,LBt =
(
rbt + γ
LϕGB
(
RWAt −RWA
RWA
))
MUBF (A.28)
FOC w.r.t. M(∗)t (comb. with FOC w.r.t. Bt ):
rmt = r
b
t + γ
MϕGB
(
RWAt −RWA
RWA
)
(A.29)
Composition of loans to firms:
LGB(∗)t = L
SME,GB(∗)
t +L
BF,GB(∗)
t (A.30)
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Macroeconomy
GDP:
Yt =
PBFt
Pt
YBFt +
PSMEt
Pt
Y SMEt (A.31)
Total bank loans:
Lt = LGBt +L
LB
t (A.32)
SME share:
SMEt =
PSMEt Y
SME
t
PtYt
Domestic bank dependence:
DBDt =
LLBt
LLBt +LGBt
Total net costs:
Γt = (LSME,GBt +L
SME,LB
t −LSMEt )+(LBF,GBt +LBF,LBt −LBFt )+O(2) (A.33)
Price normalization:
PBFt = 1 (A.34)
Current account:
CAt =−∆Mt −∆LGBt (A.35)
Net exports:
NXt =CAt −
(
−LBF,GBt−1 rBF,GBt−1 −LSME,GBt−1 rSME,GBt−1 −Mt−1rmt−1+µGBΠGBt−1
)
(A.36)
Market Clearing
Current account to ROW:
CAt =−∆Bt (A.37)
Net exports to ROW:
NXt =CAt +Bt−1rbt−1 (A.38)
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Labor:
Nt = NBFt +N
SME
t (A.39)
Investment:
It = IBFt + I
SME
t (A.40)
Capital:
Kt = KBFt +K
SME
t (A.41)
Non-tradable good:
Y SMEt = (1−ω)
(
PSMEt
Pt
)−ε(
Ct + It +
Γt
Pt
)
(A.42)
Tradable good (Follows from Walras Law):
YBFt = ω
(
PBFt
Pt
)−ε(
Ct + It +
Γt
Pt
)
+
NXt
PBFt
Exogenous Processes
Sectoral TFP shocks (home):
logθ st = ρ
θ logθ st−1−σ s
ρ†
α†
ηs,†t +
√
1−
(
ρ†
α†
)2
ηst
 , (A.43)
Sectoral TFP (foreign, i.e. “rest-of-EMU”):
logθ s∗t = ρ
θ logθ s∗t−1−α†σ sηs,†t , (A.44)
where ηs,†t , ηst
i.i.d.∼ N (0, 1).
Local banking shocks (home):
lbst = ρ lbslbst−1+σ lbs
ρ†
α†
η lbs,†t +
√
1−
(
ρ†
α†
)2
η lbst
 , (A.45)
Local banking shocks(foreign, i.e. “rest-of-EMU”):
lbs∗t = ρ
lbslbs∗t−1+α
†σ lbsη lbs,†t , (A.46)
where η lbs,†t , η lbst
i.i.d.∼ N (0, 1) and for each country c (the simulation country) α†c = (ω ′cΩωc)
1
2 ,
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ωc = vec
(
GDPj
∑ j 6=cGDPj
)
, and Ω=

1 · · · ρ†
...
. . .
...
ρ† · · · 1
.
Global banking shock:
logBt =
(
1−ρgbs
)
logB+ρgbs logBt−1−σgbsηgbst ,
where ηgbst
i.i.d.∼ N (0, 1).
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